ST02 Operating system overview
View the support package level of the installed software components
The presentation layer is based on the software components, collectively called "SAP GUI". This includes several possible implementation variants: for example, SAP GUI for HTML (Web GUI) and Web Dynpro for ABAP (WDA). Since the respective GUI depends entirely on the concrete application, the presentation layer looks very different in practice.
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There are the following reasons that may lead to the termination of this step: TP_INTERFACE_FAILURE: Unable to call tp interface. TP_FAILURE: The tp programme could not be run. For more information, see the SLOG or ALOG log file. COMMAND_FILE_IMPORT_FAILURE: Unable to import the Object List to one or more Support Packages. The protocol of the Commandfile import contains the cause of the error. OBJECTS_LOCKED_? This step checks to see if there are any objects left in unreleased jobs that will be overwritten during the commit.
This makes the technical user the dialogue user and a login in the SAP system is unrestricted. So Johannes logs in with the known password of the RFC user in the production system. Thanks to very extensive permissions, it now has access to all sorts of critical tables, transactions, and programmes in production. With the identity of the RFC user Johannes starts with the technical compromise of the production system... RFC Security: All invented - or everyday threat? Whether a simple trim, altered biometric properties or an encapsulated technical user in the SAP system: the basis of the compromise is the same. A person uses a different identity to gain access and permissions to protected areas. Moreover, the evil in all three stories could have been prevented by pro-activity. When was the last time you thought about the security of your RFC interfaces? Can you say with certainty that all your technical RFC users only have the permissions they actually need? And do you know who exactly knows the passwords of these users? Can you 100% rule out that not now in this moment an SAP user with a false identity infiltrates your production systems? Change now: It's about pro activity! But before you start now and start looking for the "identity converter" (which I really do not recommend!), I suggest that you take root of evil and proactively strengthen your RFC security. So if you want to find out more, I have the following 3 tips for you: 1) Our e-book about SAP RFC interfaces 2) Clean up our free webinar about RFC interfaces 3) Blog post about our approach to optimising RFC interfaces As always, I look forward to your feedback and comments directly below these lines!
"Shortcut for SAP Systems" makes many tasks in the area of the SAP basis much easier.
These are used to perform the following tasks:
A note box in which data of all kinds can be quickly filed and retrieved. This is what Scribble Papers promises. At first, the program looks very spartan. But once a small structure is in place, you realise the great flexibility of this little helper.
Revising them and creating access control lists can be an unmanageable task.